We propose a concise novel conceptual and biological framework for the analysis of primary visual perception (PVP) that refers to the most basic levels of our awake subjective visual experiences. Neural representations for image content elaborated within V1/V2 and the early occipitotemporal (ventral) loop remain only latent with respect to PVP until spatially localized with respect to an attending observer. This process requires more than the downstream deployment of attentional resources onto targeted neurons. Additionally, the source neurons for such processes must be linked to a neural representation subserving a first-person perspective. We hypothesize that the simultaneous emergence of both the perceptual experience of image content and the personal inference of its ownership requires the resolution of any conflicting neuronal signaling between afferent and recurrent projections within and between both the ventral and dorsal streams. The V1/V2 complex and ventral cortical areas V3 and the V4 complex together with dorsal cortical areas LIP, VIP, and 7a with additional contributions from the motion areas V5/MT (middle temporal area), FST (fundus of superior temporal area), and MST (medial superior temporal area) together with their subcortical dependencies have the physiological properties required to constitute a ''posterior perceptual core'' that encodes the normal primary perceptual experience of image content, space, and sense of minimal self.
Introduction
Our basic hypothesis is that primary visual perception (PVP) depends upon both intact early visual areas and intact specific high-order parietal areas. However, to make this hypothesis more precise, to distinguish it from related models, and to make it amenable for critical testing require more elaboration. This is especially so given the numerous controversies already extant in this field. Moreover, many discussions of perception have been hindered by multiple definitions of perceptual experience and difficulties distinguishing perceptual phenomena from high-level cognitive processes. Consequently, we seek to identify those neural networks that subserve PVP.
This term refers to the most basic level of our subjective-or equivalently ''phenomenal''-visual experiences in the awake state referable for the sake of both anatomical and functional convenience to central vision. Consequently, PVP includes elementary perceptual experience in the luminance, color, and motion domains but excludes ''blindsight,'' and higher order processes such as visual imagery and working memory that do not necessarily depend upon concurrent afferent visual stimulation.
We consider PVP as a more basic entity than the ''primary consciousness'' of Edelman (2003) , which requires the integrity of the hippocampal formations. The latter, although required for episodic memory, is not essential for PVP.
However, our definition of PVP does include the perceptual experiences associated with surface representations Shimojo 1992, 2009 ). Such representations are thought by these authors to occur at those early cortical levels that precede those involved selectively in object recognition. Some of these representations are constructed in accordance with Gestalt rules and include the experiences of texture segregation, perceptual reversals, and subjective contours. Neurons as early as V1 detect some classes of illusory contours (Grosof et al. 1993) . Others are detected in V2 (von der Heydt et al. 1984) .
However, it is not clear whether visual dreams should be classified within the framework of PVP or whether they depend upon the activation of visual stores and vivid visual imagery. The critical components of visual dreaming include V3, V3A, V4 but not V1, V5, or V6 (Solms 1997) , rendering their classification relative to PVP rather difficult.
I also previously reviewed the problems identifying the excitatory sources and targets of projected activity in visual hallucinations and focal visual seizures (Pollen 1999) . However, the variability and complexity in these internally initiated visual experiences makes these entities of less immediate relevance with respect to our present reductionistic objective to identify the minimal requirements for normal PVP.
Rationale for Our General Approach
There is currently an insurmountable gap between identifying the neural representations that correlate with perceptual experience and for accounting for such experience itself. If we want to narrow that gap, we may attempt to identify the minimal necessary requirements for perceptual experience because then we will have identified the minimal gap that needs to be closed. We see our reductionistic approach to PVP as itself a novel one that complements the more general approach to the ''neural correlates of consciousness'' (Crick and Koch 1995) and the global workspace and neuronal workspace models of Baars (1989) and Changeux and Dehaene (2008) , respectively.
As a first step toward our objectives, we identify those cortical areas and their subcortical dependencies required for representations of our most basic visual percepts within a selfreferential context. This is to suggest that image representations are linked to neural representations of at least a minimal self with a sense of perceptual ownership in order to establish a personal experience of the images and underlying objects.
However, the applicability of this framework extends beyond the obvious linkage of self and world by attention. For example, functions that build upon attentional selection such as intention and decision making also require a link to self either for ownership of the process and/or for its execution.
The present work builds upon many pertinent advances in the basic neurobiological, neurological, neuroanatomic, and cognitive neuroscientific literatures as most relevant to the issues at hand. We intend that this conceptual framework for PVP will facilitate interactions between the above disciplines and with neuropsychology and philosophy alike and also be of interest to those who share in the quest for the basis of perceptual experience.
Sequence of Presentation
I begin with an analysis of visual representations elaborated within V1/V2 and the ventral loop with respect to various aspects of PVP. I then focus upon those functions within the dorsal loop that are especially germane to perceptual experiences. These include parietal contributions to selective attention, the construction of egocentric space, and a sense of self.
The latter functions have long been inferred from neurological studies of unilateral hemispatial neglect syndromes following injury to the contralateral parietal lobe. I will then consider the consequences of bilateral parietooccipital lobe injuries as they occur in Balint's syndrome. This section will focus upon both the visual deficits unique to this syndrome as well as upon those visual experiences that survive in Balint's.
Although the early visual cortical areas together with the posterior parietal lobe are especially germane for the emergence of normal PVP, there are still other issues to consider.
These include the likely role of recurrent connections within the 2 loops and cross-connections between them to remove any major conflicts in neuronal signaling that we hypothesize might otherwise preclude the emergence of PVP.
After these topics have been discussed, I will propose experimental tests that could either support or refute our proposed hypotheses. Finally, the implications of our proposals within a broader context for the emergence of PVP will be introduced within the Conclusion.
PVP and the Ventral Loop
Some of the best evidence that early visual cortical areas contribute to PVP has been derived from studies of cortical lesions in animals and humans. PVP for isolated static achromatic visual stimuli survives brain lesions beyond but not within V1 in macaques (Merigan et al. 1993 ) and humans (Pollen 1999) . PVP for color and motion additionally requires the functional integrity of the V4 complex and V5/MT (middle temporal area), respectively (Zeki 1997 (Zeki , 2005 , and possibly their recurrent interactions with V1/V2 as well. PVP may persist even when certain visual discriminations and the identification of complex objects have been eliminated by functional impairment of V4 (Rizzo et al. 1992 ) and the inferotemporal (IT) cortex (Gross 1973; Damasio et al. 1982; Damasio 1989 ) as long as V1/V2 and their projections to still not entirely specified more anterior areas remain intact. Even so, it is remarkable how much of the IT cortex (Fig. 1 ) may be ablated bilaterally with a paucity of perceptual deficits (Gross 1973) .
However, such ablation studies cannot exclude a role for IT in perceptual experience under normal conditions. Nevertheless, this possibility is of lesser concern here given that our present objective is to identify neuronal networks for the most minimal perceptual experiences. If an explanation for even the most basic experience becomes possible, such insights will likely open the way to an understanding of more complex visual experience.
The Lateral Geniculate Nucleus
The lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) provides the major ascending pathway to V1 and also participates in its attentional modulation of (McAlonan et al. 2008) . Nevertheless, the LGN is probably not essential for PVP for at least 3 reasons. First, the visual responses of neurons in the LGN do not correlate with perceptual awareness in a perceptual suppression task in contradiction to neurons in the pulvinar (Wilke et al. 2009 ). Second, consider a human subject with an otherwise intact V1 and with normal corticocortical connections who is ''blinded'' to visual stimuli by elimination of inputs from the LGN to V1. Even so, electrical stimulation of V1 in such a subject can, as in normal subjects, evoke punctate visual experiences of brightness, motion, and color called ''phosphenes'' (Brindley and Lewin 1968; Dobelle and Miladejovsky 1974) . Third, LGN neurons lack the bandpass selectivity for both orientation and spatial frequency (Derrington and Lennie 1984) that is so prominently found in the striate cortex with bandpass properties that closely match the psychophysically identified ''channels'' that characterize human vision (Blakemore and Campbell 1969) .
Continuing Controversies on the Role of V1 in Visual Perception Lesions within either V2 or V4 both in macaques (Schiller 1993) and in humans (Rizzo and Robin 1990) interfere with the ability to distinguish an otherwise detectable test stimulus but only when it is embedded in a dense array of competing stimuli. Moreover, lesions in macaque V2 that are selectively excitotoxic to neurons cause no change in visual acuity and little change in contrast sensitivity (Merigan et al. 1993) . These results are consistent with, but not proof, for an essential role of V1 in such basic perceptual experience. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that activity within VI could project beyond V1 and bypass V2 to reach V4 and still higher cortical areas and/or subcortical areas that in theory could be essential for PVP.
Moreover, there are several lines of evidence that activation of the afferent pathways along the ventral loop may not, in itself, engender perceptual experience. For example, recurrent processing within the early ventral loop seems to be required as one condition for the perceptual experience of motion (Pascual-Leone and Walsh 2001; Supe`r et al. 2001; Silvanto et al. 2005) and also for the visual recognition of images of animals in novel, but not in familiar, natural scenes (Camprodon et al. 2010) .
However, other interpretations of these data are possible. For example, Supe`r et al. (2001) suggested that recurrent activity from V5 to V1 is one condition for the perceptual experience of motion because the behavioral response correlated with the presence of a late neuronal response component in V1 that has been assumed to represent feedback from V5. However, Tononi and Koch (2008) note that the above authors also showed that the late response could be dissociated from a behavioral response by raising the behavioral decision criteria. However, the necessity to set a decision criterion does not, in itself, disprove the conclusions of Supe`r et al. (2001) .
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and the Role of V1 in PVP Such transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies, if there are no confounding technical issues, would seem to offer strong support for the necessity of selective recurrent activity back to V1 as one condition for perceptual experience. For example, Pascual-Leone and Walsh (2001) first determined the TMS threshold to evoke large moving phosphenes from stimulation of V5. They then applied a subthreshold stimulus at a retinotopically corresponding position over V1 and found that they could eliminate the sense of movement following V5 activation by stimulating V1 from 5 to 45 ms after stimulating V5. They interpreted their result as indicating that a disruption of activity in V1 by the TMS pulse at the time of the arrival of recurrent activity from V5 eliminated the perceptual experience of motion. Thus, they proposed that activity within V5 is not sufficient to evoke the experience of motion in the absence of feedback to V1.
However, their conclusion rests on the assumption that a TMS stimulus to V1 that is subthreshold for evoking a phosphene is also subthreshold for activating either excitatory or inhibitory projections from V1 to V5 or even beyond V5 that could interfere with the processing initiated in V5. Perhaps these and related issues may be better resolved if and when dual photon optogenetic methods to selectively excite or inhibit specific classes of neurons, that are already operable in small mammals (Zhang et al. 2010) , become applicable to primates.
TMS Activation of Phosphenes Referable to ''Blind'' Fields
Some surprising findings regarding the activation of moving phosphenes by TMS referable to a blind field have recently been published. Silvanto et al. (2009) have shown that the blind-sighted subject GY could experience a white arc-shaped phosphene in both his normal field and blind field but only when TMS was applied bilaterally over V5 in accordance with selective threshold and stimulus synchrony requirements. The activation level of the normal contralateral cortex determined whether the subject experienced a second phosphene in the blinded ipsilateral cortex.
The authors propose that the ipsilateral phosphenes were referable to an ipsilateral visual field representation extending up to 15°of visual angle from the vertical meridian (Raiguel et al. 1995) in addition to the full contralateral representation. Silvanto et al. (2009) also consider an alternate possibility that there is information transfer from normal V5 to the opposite, but possibly only a partially damaged V5. The 2 sides are connected putatively via either a still functioning collosal pathway and/or from the superior colliculus. If so, then to specify a cortex as ''blinded'' may require further specification as to which cortical laminae may remain relatively normal even if not directly activated by afferent stimulation. For example, even if the middle cortical input layers were selectively damaged so that they could not transmit activity to hypothetically intact supragranular cortex, we may ask whether perceptual experience could still be engendered by activation of the supragranular laminae by collosal projections, by recurrent collaterals from the next higher cortical level, or by both? Such possibilities would provide more stringent criteria than exist at present for assessing whether any given cortical area participates in perceptual experience.
Visual Experience in Humans Even after Damage to the Geniculocalcarine Radiations
Human subjects rendered hemianopsic as a consequence of lesions within the geniculocalcarine radiations may still experience shape, colors, and motion as a consequence of focal seizure activity initiated within or beyond V4 as long as recurrent connections to a V1 remains at least partially intact. (Gloning et al. 1967; Ko¨lmel 1984 Ko¨lmel , 1985 Anderson and Rizzo 1994) . These results further suggest a role for V1 in PVP as a link in recurrent loops although not likely as a sole basis for visual experience (Pollen 1999) . However, the role of V1 with respect to perceptual experience remains controversial and an ongoing subject of investigation. (Tononi and Koch 2008) .
The projections of the ventral loop as most germane to the above findings discussed above are shown in Figure 2 . The ventral stream originates in the parvocellular layers of V1 and projects serially principally to V2, V4, TEO, and the IT cortex (Fig. 2) . Recurrent projections link higher to lower cortical areas (Rockland and Pandya 1981) .
Functions of Recursive Loops
Theorists generally have assumed, supported by the above anatomic evidence, that afferent and recurrent streams of neuronal activity seek mutually reinforcing matches within sequences of cortical areas (Milner 1974; Grossberg 1976; Edelman 1978; Koch 1987; Damasio 1989; Mumford 1992; Ullman 1995; Pollen 1999) . Such neural activity may be either stimulus specific or task dependent and likely employs both recurrent corticocortical and cortico-pulvinar--cortical projections (Shipp 2004) . Even a single bottom-up top-down cycle of neural activity may remove substantial ambiguities in object recognition almost simultaneously at multiple cortical levels (Ephshtein et al. 2008) .
There are abundant reasons to suggest that recurrent projections within both the ventral and dorsal loops participate in perceptual experience. For review, please see Pollen (1999) . One of the proposals that seems indispensable for reconciling perceptual experience and its dependence on figure-ground segregation as a precondition for object recognition within the ventral loop is that of Grossberg (1994) and Mumford (1994) . These authors suggest that figure-ground separation and object recognition cannot progress in the simple bottom-up serial fashion but must occur iteratively within recursive loops.
Within the dorsal loop, the descending fibers from the parietal lobe deploying selective attention to the ventral stream are in themselves recurrent projections. These descending projections and their interactions with afferent activity projecting up to selective parietal lobe areas would likely subserve roles in feature binding (Treisman and Gelade 1980) and object localization (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982) .
PVP and the Dorsal Lobe
The projections of the dorsal stream are also shown in Figure 2 . The dorsal loop originates in the magnocellular layers of V1 projecting via V2, V3, and V5/MT by several routes to reach several relevant cortical areas including the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area (Fig. 2 ). This latter cortical area is especially involved in spatial visual attention (Andersen et al. 1987; Blatt et al. 1990; Colby et al. 1993; Duhamel et al. 1997; Corbetta et al. 1998; Lewis and Van Essen 2000; Sereno et al. 2001; Bisley and Goldberg 2003; Goldberg, Bisley et al. 2006) . Spatial locations of visual targets are initially encoded within LIP in oculocentric coordinates with respect to the current or anticipated position of the center of gaze (Colby et al. 1995) . These and neurons in other inferior partial lobe areas can then encode spatial locations in eye-centered, head-centered, body-centered or world-centered reference frames (Andersen et al. 1993; Colby and Goldberg 1999; Mesulam 1999) .
Continuing Controversies Regarding the Parietal Lobe and Perception
The possible function of the parietal lobe in perceptual experience rather than solely in visuomotor function has long been controversial. For example, Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) suggested that the posterior parietal cortex is concerned with the spatial relationship among objects and not with their intrinsic qualities. They also recognized that a major problem remained as to how the object and spatial information carried out in the 2 separated ventral and dorsal streams would be subsequently integrated to produce a unified visual percept. However, Goodale and Milner (1992) emphasized the visuomotor control functions of the dorsal stream but concluded that the dorsal loop had no direct role in perceptual experience.
Subsequently, Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003) found that there are 2 functionally distinct anatomic components within the dorsal stream. One component projects to selective areas within the superior parietal lobe and functions with respect to control of action. However, another dorsal pathway projects to visual areas within the inferior parietal lobule that includes LIP. This pathway is also involved in visuomotor activity but also subserves an essential role in the spatial localization of attended objects and consequently in perception of space (Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003) .
Inattentional Neglect Syndromes
Unilateral hemispatial neglect of sensory stimuli in the visual field contralateral to the brain lesion may occur secondary to damage to the cingulate gyrus that normally regulates the spatial distribution of motivational salience. Deficits in selective motor-exploratory programs may occur after frontal lobe injury and impairments with respect to level of arousal may follow injury to the reticular formation. However, it is the inferior parietal components involved in inattentional neglect syndromes (Mesulam 1981 (Mesulam , 1999 that are most germane to the present analysis.
Object location for attended extrapersonal events can be specified by subdivisions within the inferior parietal lobe with respect to the egocentric and world-centered reference frames noted above. Physiological results confirm that all such reference frames are neuronally implemented within various subdivisions of the inferior parietal lobe Lewis and Van Essen 2000) . Additionally, certain types of neglect syndromes may selectively involve either near ''peripersonal'' or far ''extrapersonal'' space (Halligan and Marshall 1991) .
Particularly, pertinent results with respect to the relationship of PVP to parietal lobe function have been derived from studies of such unilateral ''inattentional'' neglect syndromes consequent to dysfunction of the inferior parietal cortex. Such deficits are more severe after injury to the nondominant hemisphere. In such cases there may be profound reductions in spatial awareness to visual stimuli in the left hemispatial field, a field that is not identical to a visual hemifield (Heilman and Valenstein 1978) . The relevance of the parietal lobe to PVP follows from clinical investigations of visual deficits after parietal lobe injury (Mesulam 1981 (Mesulam , 1999 DeRenzi 1982; Farah et al. 1990; Robertson et al. 1997; Driver and Mattingley 1998; Vuilleumier et al. 2001; Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003; Heilman 2004) .
Similar deficits may occur from injury to the pulvinar which is densely interconnected with the parietal lobes (Karnath et al. 2002) . Supporting results also follow from masking and priming studies in normal subjects (Dehaene et al. 2001) and from disruption of normal parietal lobe function by TMS in studies of change blindness (Beck et al. 2006) . Such evidence suggests that selective activations of both ventral and dorsal loops must occur concurrently to avoid an inattentional hemineglect syndrome and conversely to permit the emergence of PVP.
However, the extent of lesions contributing to inattentional neglect remains controversial. Karnath et al. (2001) have proposed that the right superior temporal cortex plays a major role in such syndromes. Nevertheless, Mort et al. (2003) utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of high spatial resolution reported that the angular gyrus (Brodmann area 39) within the inferior parietal lobe was the critical area for neglect as a consequence of a stroke in the territory of the middle cerebral artery. The most severe inattentional neglect syndromes are also associated with temporal--parietal injury centered within the supramarginal gyrus (Brodmann area 40) confirming Vallar (2001) . This area falls within the boundaries of the inferior partial lobe as do both LIP and ventral intraparietal (VIP) areas in macaques. However, it is not yet established whether Brodmann areas 39 and 40 in humans correspond to cortical areas LIP and VIP in the macaque.
Another parietal lobe syndrome is pertinent to the present discussion. This complex disorder is called Balint's syndrome.
Balint's Syndrome
Balint's syndrome is a relatively uncommon visual disorder attributable to selective bilateral parietal lobe injury. The syndrome includes deficits in visually guided reaching movements that do not result from basic deficits in sensory or motor processing. There is also a paucity of spontaneous eye movements coupled with inappropriate fixation of gaze and difficulty in voluntarily shifting fixation from one object to another (Jackson et al. 2009 ).
The third symptom of this disorder, and for present purpose the most pertinent one, is the subject's inability to perceive more than one object at a time. This condition is referred to as simultanagnosia. Moreover, the patient is unable to judge either the absolute or relative location of the perceived object (Friedman-Hill et al. 1995 . Simultanagnosia has been attributed to a disorder in the allocation of sparse attentional resources characterized by a failure in object-binding mechanisms (Robertson 2003) .
There are plausible explanations as for why visual experience in Balint's becomes restricted to a single object. Jackson et al. (2009) provide evidence that residual attentional resources are so sparse after such bilateral parietal injury that an extreme form of competition for such resources between objects makes it difficult for attention to be disengaged from a single object once engaged.
The problem as to how even a single visual experience persists in Balint's requires explanation. Robertson (2003) clarifies the problem by noting that the lesions underlying Balint's syndrome are not identical in location to those causing unilateral neglect. Balint's is most often associated with occipitoparietal damage centered in the angular gyrus, whereas the supramarginal gyrus that is generally damaged in the most severe unilateral neglect syndrome (Vallar 2001 ) may be completely spared in Balint's (Fig. 3) .
Thus, according to Robertson (2003) , parietal areas in the computation of space such as VIP, perhaps in the angular gyrus, may be compromised while those supporting attentional mechanisms within such space, perhaps derived from within the supramarginal gyrus, may survive in Balint's. We suggest that surviving sources of such attentional selection, whether in large expanses of undamaged parietal cortex, the adjacent right temporal sulcus (Karnath et al. 2001 ), or pulvinar (Shipp 2004) , may subserve attention to a single object and to its perceptual ownership. The present interpretation of the sensory deficits in Balint's further suggests that attentional selection is a basic requirement for an individual visual experience, whereas the construction of extrapersonal space is not.
PVP and Minimal Self
We now attempt to relate the normal aspects of processing described above to an associated sense of self as one requisite for the emergence of PVP. Neisser (1988) defined the most primitive sense of self in relationship to the immediate physical environment as the ''ecological self.'' Neisser's qualifier was motivated by Gibson's development of ''ecological optics' ' Gibson (1961) specifying how an animal registers the information about the environment inherent in both stationary and moving optic arrays. Gibson (1979) also proposed that perceiving requires the ''coperceiving of self.'' Gallagher (2000) incorporates Neisser's ecological self within his own broader definition of a prereflective prelinguistic ''minimal self.'' Gallagher's minimal self is implicit accepting the givenness of a first-person perspective. Such a perspective is never ''a view from nowhere'' but rather is always defined ''by its relationship to the perceiver's body which concerns not simply location and posture but action in pragmatic contexts. . .' ' Gallagher (2006) . See also Humphrey (1992), Bermudez et al. (1993) , Eilan (1995) , Guzeldere (1997) , and Taylor (2001) .
Implicit as the sense of a minimal self may be, its instantiation requires extensive neuronal processing, the function of which is best appreciated in its absence. For example, lesions of the parietal lobe may result in a loss of a subject's awareness of the contralateral body-half, a condition called ''asomatognosia'' (Critchley 1953) .
This minimal self is largely equivalent to the ''core self'' of Damasio (1999) and is engendered in part by neural activity in posterior cortical areas including right inferior parietal cortex (Taylor 2001; Vogely and Fink 2002) . This minimal visuospatial self is distinguishable from the core self of Damasio (1999) that includes homeostatic and introceptive function and from his autobiographical self of ''extended consciousness.'' Our minimal self is also distinguishable from the very high level selfreflective introspective self of Gusnard et al. (2001) and Goldberg, Harel and Malach (2006) that requires processing at least as far anterior as medial prefrontal cortex. All these levels of self are presumably linked to produce an integrated sense of self in fully intact subjects, but minimal visuospatial self may be preserved independently of higher order representations of self in subjects with severe bilateral anterior cortical lesions.
For example, prefrontal areas are not indispensable for the basic attributes of PVP including perceptual ownership. These have long been known to survive bilateral prefrontal ablation (Penfield and Evans 1935; Heath et al. 1949; Pollen 2008; Tononi and Koch 2008) . This is not to deny that some such patients may experience subtle changes such as an alteration in the threshold for visual backward masking particularly after a lesion of the left anterior prefrontal cortex (Del Cul et al. 2009 ). See also Latto and Cowey (1971) and Lau and Passingham (2006) .
Anatomical Substrates for Minimal Self
The medial parietal/posterior cingulate regions that may mediate interactions between lateral inferior parietal and medial prefrontal cortices have been proposed to subserve representations of a mental self (Lou et al. 2004 ). However, not all these interactions need be related to minimal self. Rather, the medial parietal cortex or ''precuneus'' may comprise either a subsequent parietal link for the establishment of a minimal self and PVP or the first subsequent stage supporting the reportability of perceptual experience. This proposal is based upon findings in humans that brain activity may persist in occipitoparietal areas during the unconscious persistent vegetative state. However, the transition to a minimally conscious state, as evidenced by self-initiated brain activity as measured by fMRI studies, requires additional linkages to medial parietal cortex (Laureys et al. 2004) .
The above findings are consistent with the observations of Damasio (1999) that patients with bilateral damage of such medial parietal regions or to slightly more anterior cingulate cortex demonstrate profound disturbances in consciousness. Perhaps, the sense of a minimal self and a sense of perceptual ownership are, if not anatomically and functionally inseparable, at least closely related.
PVP and Interactions between Ventral and Dorsal Loops
Thus far, we have considered those aspects of ''binding'' from one cortical area to another separately within either the ventral or dorsal stream. However, there are also cross-connections between the ventral and dorsal loops at multiple cortical levels. For example, reciprocal connections connect LIP to V3, V3A, V4, MT, MST (medial superior temporal area), 7a, VIP, and PO (parietooccipital area) (Blatt et al. 1990) (Fig. 2) .
Sources of Spatial Attention in the Parietal Lobe
Neurons in the lateral intraparietal sulcus (LIP) have properties that are especially well suited to confer attention to a salient stimulus and to provide the oculomotor system with a salient target for a saccade when such is its goal (Goldberg, Bisley et al. 2006) . Such selectivity for gaze direction by those parietal neurons active in attentional selection may also contribute to a sense of first-person perspective when gaze direction is referenced with respect to the representation of the head and the latter with respect to the body (Gru¨sser and Landis 1991; Andersen et al. 1993; Karnath et al. 1993; Gallagher 2000 Gallagher , 2006 . Attentional functions, in addition to those subserved by LIP, may, at least in part, be also subserved by neurons in the VIP that integrate activity from visual, somatosensory, vestibular, auditory, and motor-related areas Pandya 1980, 1986; Lewis and Van Essen 2000) . This integration may result in a polysensory head-centered representation of near space (Colby et al. 1993) .
Thus, PVP under normal conditions seems to require the neuronal coupling between early visual cortices in the occipital lobe subserving image content with specific areas in the inferior parietal lobe subserving the sources of attentional selection. These probably include at least both LIP (Bisley and Goldberg 2003) and VIP (Cook and Maunsell 2002) and possibly 7a and MST as well (Lewis and Van Essen 2000) . The anatomical basis for direct interactions between these parietal areas is shown in Figure 2 .
We propose that the generation of a representation of a firstperson attentional perspective within the parietal lobe is just as essential for the emergence of PVP as are the downstream functions of attentional selection upon image representations (Desimone and Duncan 1995) . We further suggest that these same considerations would hold even when the reference point for our first-person visual perspective is shifted outside the body. Such may occur in the so-called ''out of body'' experiences of neurological origin caused by interference with the normal function of the right temporoparietal cortex (Blanke et al. 2005) . Analogous results may also occur after the experimental manipulation of conflicting visual and somatosensory sense data in healthy subject (Lenggenhager et al. 2007; Ehrsson 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson 2008; Blanke and Metzinger 2009 ). In the latter experiments, self-localization is systematically biased to where a visual--tactile event is seen (Lenggenhager et al. 2009 ).
Reference Frames and Transcortical Linkages
The present hypothesis proposes that recurrent neuronal networks are required both within and across the early ventral and dorsal loops. The dependence of perceptual experience to the reference frame most relevant to a particular sensory modality and motor act has also long been established in the physiological and neurological literatures (Hyva¨rinen 1982; Andersen et al. 1993; Mesulam 1999) . Such reference frames and neural relationships between them would seem to comprise appropriate networks to support the derivation of an implicit sense of first-person perspective for attended objects as noted above. Moreover, the hierarchical engagement of neural mechanisms for spatial attention (Bisley and Goldberg 2003) intention (Andersen 1995; Snyder et al. 1997) , decision making (Platt and Glimcher 1999; Shadlen and Newsome 2001) , and visuomotor activity (Andersen et al. 1987) would suggest the relevance of such a framework for such related functions.
Some reference frames specify the location of an image representation with respect to the perceived location of the image in extrapersonal space. For example, Karnath et al. (1991 Karnath et al. ( , 1993 established that proprioceptive signals from the posterior cervical muscles activated by either trunk rotation or neck muscle vibration define an axis trunk orientation that can be shifted by the above types of stimulation. Selective unilateral activation of the vestibular system can also shift the hemispatial axis (Rubens 1985; Cappa et al. 1987) .
Such shifts in a hemispatial axis to the side contralateral to a parietal lobe injury either by vestibular or posterior cervical proprioceptive stimulation can transiently ameliorate hemispatial parietal neglect. The above results provide some of the best neurological evidence that the perceived localization of objects in extrapersonal space is normally dependent upon the neural coordinates of spatial references frames that may be shifted in space by nonvisual sensory inputs.
The Posterior Perceptual Core
The minimal networks necessary to express representational completeness for PVP may be considered to constitute a visual ''posterior perceptual core.'' The relationship of this core for central vision to higher visual cortical areas is shown in Figure 2 .
We propose that the posterior perceptional core for central vision consists of V1, V2, and V3 (encoded in pale yellow) through to at least V4 and the posterior regions of TEO (encoded in red). Some workers apply the term ''posterior inferior temporal (PIT) cortex'' to encompass the latter 2 areas (Conway and Tsao 2009) . However, Zeki (1996) considers PIT as largely a functional component of the V4 complex. Terminology aside, we include these areas within the posterior perceptual core because the chromatic properties of many clusters of neurons within the latter cortical expanse correlate well with the perceptual experiences of color (Zeki 1997; Conway and Tsao 2009; Banno et al. 2010) .
The proposed core also includes the first 2 tiers of the dorsal loop (encoded in green). The first such tier includes the motion-selective V5/MT complex. The second tier includes the inferior parietal lobe complex of VIP, LIP, and 7a that contribute among other sensory functions to the downstream deployment of selective attention, the construction of spatial reference frames, and the elaboration of higher level motion selectivity within cortices FST (fundus of superior temporal area) and MST.
The cortical areas above have been defined for the macaque monkey. The precise human homologues of some (e.g., 7a and the posterior part of TEO) remain uncertain.
The anatomical results (Fig. 2 ) document that these second tier dorsal loop cortices do not directly project back to V2 and V1. Attentional modulation of the early cortical visual areas requires the intermediary activation of the ventral and dorsal loop cortices of V4 and V5/MT, respectively (Fig. 2) . Thus, the strength of spatial attention reaching back to V1/V2 may be codependent on activity derived from the parietal lobe and concurrent activation within V4 and/or V5/MT referable to a common spatial locus. This conjunction of neuronal activity may serve to enhance stimulus specificity with respect to color and luminance (V4), motion (V5/MT), and also to the construction of attended surface and object representations and their relative layout in depth Shimojo 1992, 2009 ).
Multilevel Neuronal Consensus within the Perceptual Core
We hypothesize that the simultaneous emergence of both the perceptual experience of image content and the inference of its ownership requires the resolution of conflicting sensory data both within and between the ventral and dorsal loops (Pollen 2008) . The achievement of such a neuronal consensus is generally consistent with the models of Taylor (2001) and Shipp (2004) in which perceptual experience requires that ''salience maps'' (Koch and Ullman 1985; Goldberg Bisley et al. 2006) for object identification and spatial localization be congruent across both cortical and subcortical mappings.
However, although the implications of the terms ''neuronal consensus'' and ''salience maps'' will often be identical, there may be situations in which one term is more relevant than the other. First, we do not always attend to the most conspicuous or salient feature within a scene. Under some conditions, we seek to ''break camouflage'' to locate and identify a hidden object. Second, the more general term ''consensus'' allows for carrying along a graded extension of representational content beyond the most central attentional focus. Finally, ''consensus'' allows that there may be no gaps within the multilevel neuronal support space contributing to the representation of an attended feature.
Is Attention Invariably Required for Perceptual Experience?
A current controversial topic in psychophysics is whether a stimulus can be seen in the near absence of attention (van Boxtel et al. 2010 ). For example, Li et al. (2002) demonstrated that subjects can rapidly detect images of animals or vehicles in briefly presented natural scenes in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) while simultaneously performing a competing attentionally demanding task directed toward a more centrally located and different class of stimuli. They conclude that some visual tasks may proceed in the near absence of attention.
However, even if the rapid categorization of such novel scenes as well as the gist of a scene exacts little attentional cost (Li et al. 2002) , such a result would not negate an active role for the posterior parietal lobe in related sensory functions. For example, the localization of the presented stimuli in the RSVP task remains accessible to the viewer unlike the situation in Balint's syndrome where no such accurate localization is possible because of bilateral occipitoparietal injury centered in the angular gyri (Robertson 2003) .
Moreover, there may be major functional differences between states in which there is only the near absence of attentional resources and states in which there is none at all. For example, the withdrawal of attentional resources is a defining characteristic of hemispatial neglect syndromes. It would be of interest to learn whether a functional distinction between the ''near absence'' versus ''complete absence'' of attentional resources could be experimentally tested. For example, one could first determine the threshold at which TMS of the right parietal lobe (Beck et al. 2006 ) produces a brief contralateral hemispatial neglect syndrome and then assess whether the left sides of the visual scenes in the RSVP paradigm persist or disappear during interference with parietal lobe function. Looking at the problem another way, one could test whether subjects with severe hemineglect syndromes would still perceive and recognize the left side of successive stimuli in the RSVP paradigm.
Similarities and Differences between Models for Neural Correlates of Perceptual Experience
All current models generally assume that each subjective phenomenal experience is a consequence of a unique neural state (Crick and Koch 1995) . This conclusion is consistent with the present model, that of Tononi and Edelman (1998) and Tononi (2008) on ''consciousness as integrated information,'' the ''neural stance'' model of Lamme (2006) , and the ''central representation'' model of Taylor (2001 Taylor ( , 2007 . These models also assume hierarchical and recurrent processing. See also Block (2009) .
However, in other respects, these models derive from different sets of primary principles. Our hypothesis differs from other current models primarily in its objective to define the anatomical and functional correlates for the minimally definable entity of PVP. Tononi (2008) builds upon a very abstract assumption of consciousness as highly integrated information and proceeds to elaborate models to quantitate the information content of higher perceptual functions based upon this assumption. If future such models become increasingly related to functionally entities, it will be of interest to learn whether and how their predictions will converge or diverge with those of the present approach.
The view of Lamme (2006) that recurrent processing either is equivalent to consciousness or a surrogate marker for it is consistent with but goes beyond my earlier proposal (Pollen 1999 ) that dynamic incongruities must be resolved both within and between ascending and descending streams as a condition for the emergence of perceptual experience. I did not equate recurrent processing in itself with consciousness but rather considered recurrent processing as a means to achieve a consensus of neuronal activity across ascending and descending pathways. In any case, both Lamme's proposal and my own would be open to further investigation if we could suggest how to distinguish whether it is recurrent processing per se (Lamme 2006) or the stable state it engenders (Pollen 1999 ) that is more essential for perceptual experience.
Lamme (2006) also proposes that the recurrent processing within the V14V24V44 TE string of cortical areas may be sufficient to engender subjective experience even in the absence of projections that confer spatial reportability initially via access to the parietal lobe. We do not doubt that Lamme's string of recurrent ventral cortical areas specifies the latent information required for luminance and color processing. However, in our view, as documented earlier, the essential condition for the emergence of subjective experience is the linkage of one or more of the above visual cortices to the inferior parietal lobe that normally specifies the spatial localization of image content both with respect to our world and to the observer.
Our primary objective here differs from that of global workspace models (Baars 1989; Changeux and Dehaene 2008) in one major respect. We do not doubt that neuronal activity in the posterior perceptual core can gain entry to the global workspace and, in turn, be influenced by it. However, we believe that the evidence reviewed here suggests that selective activation within the posterior core, in itself, is sufficient to engender primary visual experience. If we are correct, then the quest for the basis for the emergence of PVP reduces to consideration of a substantially smaller set of anatomic and functional entities than is encompassed by the entire global workspace.
Tests of the Present Hypothesis
Broadly speaking, we will propose tests of our hypotheses that will address the role of selective attention with relevance to both downstream targets and especially upon the function of the attentional sources. We will also suggest tests for multilevel recessive linkages within both the ventral and dorsal loops and also between them. Furthermore, if our hypotheses hold for the emergence of perceptual experience in the primates, we suggest that analogous or equivalent principles of brain organization are likely to apply within other phylla for those animals meeting behavioral tests for the presence of perceptual experience and the ability to make intentional decisions (Denton 2006 ). We will also further specify tests to define those minimal networks in the primate that we predict would express perceptual experience and the accompanying sense of its ownership for elemental visual stimuli. These considerations motivate the 4 tests of our hypotheses noted below:
1. Our hypothesis would be disproved if it could be shown that PVP persists when the downstream deployment of selective attention onto the representation of a visual target represented in the ventral loop could be simulated by electrical stimulation or iontophoresis of the requisite neurotransmitters onto downstream target neurons even when the source neurons of such ''attentive'' processes in relationship to a representation of first-person perspective have been functionally eliminated. 2. The present model also predicts that there would be reasonably tight temporal correlations in neural activity underlying perceptual experience within a common perceptual domain (i.e., luminance, color, or motion) at corresponding retinotopic sites not only between one cortical area to another within the ventral and dorsal loop considered separately as has already been shown for such coupling within the ventral stream (Buffalo et al. 2010) but also for linkages between the 2 loops. Our model would be disproved if such linkages across loops did not exist. 3. The proposed model would also be invalidated if it could be shown that there exists any visual animal within any phylum that meets stringent tests for the existence of subjective visual experience (Denton 2006 ) but has no bidirectional links between representations of image content to those for an attentive core self. 4. The model also predicts that perceptual experience, at least for the most elemental static achromatic stimuli, that is, a 2D Gabor ''patch'' (Daugman 1985) , would survive ablation or functional deactivation of all neurons in cortices beyond V1/ V2 within the ventral loop except V4 and V5/MT. These latter cortical areas are necessary to convey transcortical selective attention back to V1/V2 from parietal areas (Fig. 2) . Thus, we suggest that fiber projections to and from the inferior parietal lobe to V1/V2 subserving both spatial attention to targets within these early visual cortical areas and a concurrent first-person perspective would have to remain operant for the most primitive aspects of PVP to survive. The resultant residual perception might well consist of a world in shades of gray but with preservation of visual acuity and object recognition as reported by the noted painter with acquired bilateral achromatopsia (Sacks and Wasserman 1987) .
Anticipated difficulties in some of the tests described above include the possibility that an apparent failure of a subject to report a subjective experience may be confounded by a deficit in motor reportability and mechanisms of cognitive access more generally. However, the applications of fMRI to distinguish networks involved in reportability independent of the particular perceptual experience (Hulme et al. 2008 ) and other networks involved in the detection of perceptual experience and motor intent independent of the capacity for actual movement (Owen et al. 2006 ) suggest that such difficulties may not be insurmountable.
Conclusions
We have attempted to define the most basic level of our subjective visual experiences and in identifying their anatomical neural correlates and related functional properties. The model is consistent with the deficits in PVP after injury to V1/ V2 and the specific visual agnosias that occur after lesions of higher extrastriate areas in the ventral loop. The model is also consistent with the known sources of spatial attention and intention in the dorsal loop and the corresponding contralateral inattentional hemispatial neglect syndromes with respect to specific egocentric reference frames after inferior parietal lobe injury. Above all, our model appears to accommodate within in a single concise conceptual framework, an appreciable range of experimental observations arising from diverse neuroscientific disciplines.
The present model also provides a challenge for future studies to determine whether any additional anatomic and functional entities beyond the posterior perceptual core are required for the emergence of PVP. Our analysis has not identified the mechanism by which such subjective experience itself emerges but has defined plausible neural substrata and functional conditions required for such emergence and thus has drawn increased focus to accounting for PVP itself. In identifying the minimal requirements for PVP or at least something close to such requirements-we have narrowed the gap that needs to be closed between identifying the requirements for perceptual experience and for accounting for such experience itself.
Moreover, within the context of out model, subjective experience seems to provide the answer to the question as to how the visual world informs the minimal self of its image content-either preattentively or attentively-at any given instant. If so, there may be no reason to consider such an answer as epiphenomenal. The percept appears to represent the explicit solution of all the neural computations yielding the former's unique status.
An intriguing aspect of the present hypothesis is that the modules for image content and minimal self have been assumed to be both functionally independent of each other yet mutually referential. This is to suggest that changes in activity in one such domain do not appreciably alter either the specificity of the neural activity or subjective experience in the other. For example, we can distinguish one hue from another without modifying our sense of its spatial location and perceptual ownership and we can also alter our relative position with respect to a colored patch without altering its hue. Thus, there is no appreciable ''blending'' of representations for image content, spatial location, and minimal self. One way such extensive linkages could be established without blending of functionally distinct domains would be by multilevel long-range high-frequency coupling at gamma frequencies as recently demonstrated between the frontal eye fields and V4 (Gregoriou et al. 2009 ).
Such specificity of image processing is consistent with Zeki's proposal (Zeki 2003 ) that ''processing nodes'' become perceptual nodes under certain conditions. One such condition Zeki cites is Kant's contention (Kant 1781) that it is only the highest level of self that perceives an image representation. However, there are at least 2 alternatives to the Kantian view. First, there is substantial neurological evidence cited earlier that such highest levels of self, dependent upon prefrontal cortical areas, are not required for PVP. Second, there is no present evidence that either a minimal or higher level of self directly interprets or perceives the full representational content expressed within the computationally extensive image representations elaborated within the posterior perceptual core other than by deploying spatial attention upon such spatially localized image representations and encoding their localizations in egocentric space.
Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that it is the multilevel linkage of several successive processing stages binding together activity in the early visual cortices and dorsal streams that engenders a unique perceptual state that is not entirely specified or predicted by the network properties at each of these levels. Although the invocation of emergent properties as one way to resolve such complex issues has a long history in the consideration of conscious experience, the present analysis is the first to suggest that such properties, if they exist at all within perceptual systems, are operant as early as the linkage of representations of image content to those of an attentive first-person perspective that also implies a minimal self and sense of perceptual ownership of such image representations. 
